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TAKING A STAND?: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT
OF THE SOCIAL AND RACIAL EFFECTS OF
RECENT INNOVATIONS IN SELF-DEFENSE LAWS
Mario L. Barnes*
[I]t‘s time to question laws that senselessly expand the concept of selfdefense and sow dangerous conflict in our neighborhoods. These laws try
to fix something that was never broken. There has always been a legal
defense for using deadly force if—and the ―if‖ is important—no safe
retreat is available.1

INTRODUCTION
Perhaps, not surprisingly, the controversy over the rise of self-defense
reforms in the United States that have come to be known as ―Stand Your
Ground‖ (SYG) laws,2 began with a story about colors. This Article
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and CoDirector, Center on Law, Equality, and Race, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
This project benefited from presentations at the University of Hawaii William S. Richardson
School of Law, Saint Thomas University School of Law (Fla.), Tulane Law School, the U.C.
Irvine Center for Psychology and Law, the 2014 Association of Critical Race and Whiteness
Studies conference in Brisbane, Australia, and support received while I was a Visiting
Scholar at Melbourne Law School (Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law) and the American
Bar Foundation. Many colleagues provided helpful insights on this initial phase of a larger
project, especially Shalonda Baker, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Devon Carbado, Donna Coker,
Adam Feibelman, Andrea Freeman, Jonathan Glater, Kaaryn Gustafson, Linda Kreiger,
Charles Lawrence, Tamara Lawson, Justin Levinson, Pamela Metzger, Saru Matambanadzo,
Ira Steven Nathenson, L. Song Richardson, and Geoffrey Ward. I am indebted to Matthew
Fritz-Mauer for his dedicated and superb research assistance and to my former students,
Carolyn M. Hutcherson, Paul Kaster, Joshua Paster, Nneka Uzodinma, and Zachary Weaver,
for research and papers that helped to shape my initial thoughts on this project. This Article
is part of a larger symposium entitled Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods
Conference held at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the symposium,
see Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods
Conference, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2953 (2015).
1. Eric Holder, Att‘y Gen., Address at the NAACP Annual Convention in Orlando, Fla.
(July 16, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-ericholder-addresses-naacp-annual-convention.
2. Stand Your Ground (SYG) has become a popular phrase used to describe reformed
self-defense statutes that approve persons perceiving a threat of violence to more liberally
respond with state-sanctioned violence. When first proposed, these laws were also referred
to in the press as ―make my day,‖ ―shoot first,‖ and ―license to kill‖ laws. See, e.g., Lisa
Mahapatra, Stand Your Ground: 26 U.S. States Have “Shoot First” Laws, INT‘L BUS. TIMES
(July 18, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/stand-your-ground-26-us-states-haveshoot-first-laws-1351127; Mary Sanchez, Stand Your Ground Laws a Shaky Basis for
Justice, KAN. CITY STAR (June 17, 2013, 10:22 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/
opn-columns-blogs/mary-sanchez/article321136/Stand-Your-Ground-laws-a-shaky-basis-
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principally applies an empirical method and critical race theory (eCRT) lens
to explore whether these reformed statutes, which generally have authorized
greater use of force within the context of self-defense, deter crime and
differentially affect Whites, Blacks, and other racial groups. In an early
case that had the potential to severely undermine the success of such law
reforms, however, different colors were at issue. In 2004, Florida enacted
what would become a blueprint for SYG laws by modifying the Florida
criminal code to do away with the common law duty to retreat for those
who reasonably believe it is necessary to defend themselves against an
imminent use of unlawful force.3 The law reform, which the legislature
argued would allow citizens to stand up for themselves in response to
violent threat without fear of criminal or civil sanction,4 went into effect in
2005. In 2006, an early controversial case involved two very colorfully
named individuals. Damon ―Red Rock‖ Darling and Leroy ―Yellowman‖
Larose were involved in a Miami shoot-out that resulted in the death of
nine-year-old Sherdavia Jenkins.5 Both men had extensive criminal
records, and some reports suggested the shooting broke out during the
course of an ill-fated drug deal.6 Darling claimed, however, that he feared
that Larose was going to shoot him, so he drew his gun and began
shooting.7 Admittedly, these were likely not the victims of violence Florida
sought to empower when the law was changed,8 but there was a colorable
for-justice.html (―Prior to the spread of these new laws, people were expected to back down,
to retreat, if possible. Shoot First, Stand Your Ground, Make My Day laws can make it legal
to refuse to walk away.‖ (emphasis added)).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2014). The common law duty required persons
confronted with force to withdraw from the encounter if they could do so without
endangering themselves. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 227–28
(6th ed. 2012) (noting that a ―no retreat‖ rule is now applied in a majority of jurisdictions).
The no-retreat rule, which previously was mostly limited to defense of home statutes, now
applies every place a person had a lawful right to be. Defense of home statutes, which are
commonly referred to as Castle Doctrine statutes, not only provide that home dwellers are
not required to retreat from threatened violence, but also may carry a presumption with
regard to the reasonableness of one‘s fear. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013. For a criticism of this
overlooked aspect of Florida‘s SYG law reform, see Donna Coker, “Stand Your Ground” in
Context: Race, Gender and Politics, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 943, 944–45 (2014) (noting that,
in addition to eliminating the duty to retreat in the self-defense language, the reformed
statute included immunity from prosecution for successful SYG claimants, the presumption
of reasonableness for those alleging defense of home, and the availability of using deadly
force to interdict a forcible felony, whether one was in reasonable fear or not). Remarkably,
it appears that the reasonable fear to stand one‘s ground could even apply if an initial
aggressor were fleeing. See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your
Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 834 (2013) (describing the facts from Hair v. State,
17 So. 3d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).
4. See S.B. 4346, 107th Leg., 37th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (claiming the purpose of the
law was to ―restore absolute rights of law-abiding people to protect themselves . . . without
fear of prosecution or civil action‖).
5. David Ovalle, Girl‟s Parents Face Her Accused Killer, MIAMI HERALD, July 28,
2006, at 1B.
6. David Ovalle, Sherdavia‟s Killer Gets Lesser Charge But Could Face 50 Years,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 2009, at 1A.
7. Id.
8. See Kris Hundley et al., Florida „Stand Your Ground‟ Law Yields Some Shocking
Outcomes Depending on How Law Is Applied, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013),
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argument that one or both of them could claim they were standing their
ground.9
Ultimately, the outcome of the case did not turn on Darling‘s SYG claim.
Instead, a news report at the time indicated: ―The six-person jury never
agreed which man was acting in self-defense, however, because members
couldn‘t settle on who actually started the gunfight. The jurors did agree
that Darling was guilty of manslaughter for recklessly spraying the
neighborhood with bullets.‖10 This rejection of Darling‘s claim was likely
important for a number of reasons related to the viability of the then-nascent
law reform. First, had he been successful in his SYG claim, the statute
would have absolved a felon involved in a gunfight, potentially as part of a
drug deal, of criminal liability for the killing of an innocent child. Without
any further consequences, the optics of that outcome would have been
extremely poor. Under Florida law, however, Darling also would have
been provided immunity from civil liability.11 While the claim is
speculative in nature, it seems at least plausible to assume that the law
being used to such an effect, early on, would have had an impact on public
sentiment regarding these laws.12 Moreover, such a result in Florida likely
would have slowed the spread of these statutes to other states. Instead,
three years after the killing, the jury held Darling criminally responsible for
Sherdavia‘s death. This verdict gave the Jenkins family a measure of

http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/florida-stand-your-ground-law-yieldssome-shocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133 (assessing SYG case data and indicating
that many who invoke the law have prior violent criminal histories).
9. See Ovalle, supra note 6. Darling actually made a motion to assert immunity under
SYG, but the defense was rejected by the trial judge and that decision was upheld by an
appeals court. See Tonyaa Weathersbee, How Stand Your Ground Is Killing Black People,
ROANOKE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.roanoke.com/opinion/commentary/
weathersbee-how-stand-your-ground-is-killing-black-people/article_d738013c-abcc-11e38640-0017a43b2370.html.
10. See Ovalle, supra note 6. While the defense claimed Darling was entitled to stand
his ground, the prosecution alleged he was engaged in two potential unlawful acts that would
exclude him from availing himself of the defense: (1) that he was a felon in possession of a
gun, and (2) that the gunfight may have resulted from a botched drug sale. Id. The effect of
status crimes, such as felons in possession of firearms, however, is now being contested in a
SYG jurisdiction. See Marc Freeman, Stand Your Ground May Be Defense for Felon, SUNSENTINEL (July 17, 2014), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-07-17/news/fl-stand-yourground-felon-opinion-20140716_1_your-ground-ground-law-felon (noting that an appeals
court in Florida‘s Fourth District reversed its earlier decision disallowing a SYG defense for
felon in possession of a firearm and that the Florida Supreme Court has now taken up such a
case).
11. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2014) (―A person who uses or threatens to use force as
permitted in § 776.012, § 776.013, or § 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune
from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or threatened use of such force by the
person, personal representative, or heirs of the person against whom the force was used or
threatened, unless the person against whom force was used or threatened is a law
enforcement officer . . . .‖).
12. See Weathersbee, supra note 9 (commenting that Sherdavia Jenkins‘s status as an
innocent victim should have been a catalyst for reconsidering or repealing SYG laws). For
theories of the connection between legislation and community values, see generally
Elizabeth Megale, A Call for Change: A Contextual-Configurative Analysis of Florida‟s
“Stand Your Ground” Laws, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (2014).
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justice—albeit with a manslaughter rather than murder conviction for
Darling—but the finding of guilty and three years that passed between the
killing and conviction also may have given the SYG law reform the
opportunity it needed to garner support in Florida and expand to other
jurisdictions.
Almost immediately after Florida modified its self-defense statute, the
United States underwent an SYG revolution, with a considerable number of
states enacting similar laws. SYG reforms were not, however, achieved
through deliberate or organic processes built upon Florida‘s successful
experience with the reforms. Instead, as is discussed in greater detail
below, SYG initiatives were quickly taken up in many states largely
because of to the political efforts of the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC) and the National Rifle Association (NRA).13 Jurisdictions
adopted varying elements of Florida‘s statute. Acknowledged by former
Attorney General Holder in the quote that begins this Article, the simplest
variant of the law reform did away with the common law duty to retreat for
those threatened with violent force. This adoption alone can be more or
less dangerous depending on whether the jurisdictions use objective,
subjective, or hybrid forms of a reasonableness inquiry to assess a given
threat.14 The more robust variants of the reforms, however, imported
Florida‘s innovation of connecting self-defense claims to justifications
related to defending one‘s home. Historically, many common law
jurisdictions have blessed a broader use of force when defending one‘s
home, known as defense of habitation or the ―Castle Doctrine.‖15 Under

13. See “Stand Your Ground” Laws: Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the
Expanded Use of Deadly Force: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 8 (2013)
(statement of Professor Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Sullivan
Testimony],
available
at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-2913SullivanTestimony.pdf (―Since 2005, over half the states have now passed laws based in
whole or in part on Florida‘s law and ALEC‘s model legislation.‖); Megale, supra note 12,
at 1079–84; P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle
Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your
Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Zachary L. Weaver, Florida‟s “Stand Your Ground”
Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 396–97
(2008) (identifying the NRA‘s role in pushing the law change in Florida and beyond); John
Nichols, How ALEC Took Florida‟s „License to Kill‟ Law National, NATION (Mar. 21, 2012,
10:57 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/166978/how-alec-took-floridas-license-kill-lawnational (identifying ALEC‘s role in spreading SYG laws).
14. Many jurisdictions claim to use an objective standard of reasonableness. The Model
Penal Code (MPC), by contrast, proposes a subjective standard. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (―[U]se of force upon or toward another person is
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). Some
jurisdictions, such as New York, have crafted a hybrid standard that mixes subjective and
objective beliefs. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (clarifying that, although
New York had incorporated the Model Penal Code‘s subjective self-defense language into its
statute, the standard still requires jurors to objectively assess whether a person with the
experiences of the defendant would feel as the defendant claims to have felt).
15. The Castle Doctrine incorporates the notion that one‘s home is one‘s castle—a place
where one should feel safest—and threats to one‘s home are thought to be extremely
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this doctrine, when responding to violence threatened within the home,16
typically by uninvited non-occupants,17 one did not have to argue selfdefense. Instead, in most circumstances, a homeowner enjoys no duty to
retreat and a rebuttable presumption that they have used force
appropriately.18 Florida‘s defense of home statute, section 776.013 of
Florida Statutes, explicitly includes a presumption of reasonableness for
violence committed within dwellings and certain occupied vehicles.19
While the self-defense statute, section 776.012, does not expressly include
a presumption of reasonableness, law enforcement practices effectively
achieve a similar result by preventing authorities from charging a person
with an ostensibly valid SYG claim, as long as the person was in a place
they had a lawful right to be and did not engage in unlawful activity.20
The SYG amendments also affected the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in criminal cases where putative defendants claimed they were
standing their ground. In many of these cases, prosecutors have struggled
to determine whether charges should be brought.21 As such, another
innovation jurisdictions could borrow from Florida is to effectively
transform self-defense in many cases where an SYG defense is alleged,
dangerous to not just property but one‘s family. Versions of the Castle Doctrine exist in
most U.S. jurisdictions. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 228–29.
16. Under the Castle Doctrine, jurisdictions typically address not only uses of violence
against those within the home, but those attempting to enter the home as well. See, e.g., State
v. Boyett, 185 P.3d 355, 361 (N.M. 2008) (holding that defense of habitation instructions
were available to a defendant who shot a victim on his front doorstep). But see People v.
Brown, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 519 (1992) (determining that a resident has no ―reasonable
expectation of protection from unauthorized intrusion onto the kind of front porch involved
in the case‖ and, as such, the porch did not constitute entry under CAL. PENAL CODE § 198.5
(the Home Protection Bill of Rights)). Other jurisdictions have expanded the doctrine to
include other discrete localities, such as workplaces and motor vehicles. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. § 14:20(4)(a) (2014) (establishing Castle Doctrine defense when ―inside a dwelling, a
place of business, or a motor vehicle‖); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b) (2014) (―The lawful
occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace is presumed to have held a reasonable fear
of imminent death or serious bodily harm . . . .‖).
17. Even jurisdictions that have expanded the application of their Castle Doctrine
statutes exempt the rebuttable presumption of justified violence from applying to residents
and other lawful occupants of a dwelling. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(c)(1); TEX.
PENAL CODE § 9.31 (2014) (justifying use of force against a person ―who unlawfully and
with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor‘s
occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment‖).
18. See, e.g., Brown, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515–16 (noting that the California defense of
home statute ―creates a rebuttable presumption that a residential occupant has a reasonable
fear of death or great bodily injury when he or she uses deadly force against an unlawful and
forcible intruder into the residence‖).
19. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2014); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 3. Individuals in SYG states, then, may feel as entitled to respond to
perceived threats of violence on the streets as they would threats within their homes. In
effect, SYG laws create a right for people to move through public spaces feeling as if they
are surrounded by ―portable castles.‖ This phrase and apt characterization of SYG were
suggested to me by Professor Ira Nathenson.
21. See Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the
Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors‟ Discretion, and the Stand
Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 271, 284–90 (2012); see also Weaver,
supra note 13, at 406–09.
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from an affirmative defense argued during a trial, into a potential bar to
criminal prosecution.22 Soon after Florida undertook its law reform, a
number of legal scholars began to produce critiques of SYG. The greatest
number of these articles substantially focused on the expanded embrace of
citizen violence and the questionable wisdom of providing criminal and
civil immunity to such behavior.23 While the majority of this scholarship
provides informative commentaries, as described below, this project has a
different focus. Relying both upon recent empirical studies and insights
from CRT, this Article seeks to empirically and critically investigate the
deterrence value24 and potential racialized effects of SYG statutes.
A number of the jurisdictions adopting Florida-like changes to their selfdefense statutes mimicked Florida‘s rationale of removing restraints from
potential victims of violence.25 Few, if any, commented on whether the law
changes would deter violent crime—a concern that even if it were not the
stated goal of a statute, one would imagine would inform criminal law
reforms.26 Additionally, no evidence suggests that most adopting states
22. See Jennifer Randolph, How to Get Away with Murder: Criminal and Civil
Immunity Provision in “Stand Your Ground” Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 616–
25 (2014). In Florida, where a decision is made to prosecute someone despite facts that may
support an SYG claim, the defendant is still entitled to raise SYG as an affirmative defense,
but doing so triggers a pretrial hearing on the issue. See Coker, supra note 3, at 944 (noting
that the availability of the defense is assessed using the ―preponderance of evidence
standard‖); Lawson, supra note 21, at 285–97.
23. See Coker, supra note 3; Lave, supra note 3; Lawson, supra note 21; Randolph,
supra note 22; Weaver, supra note 13; see also Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real
Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered Women‟s Syndrome, and Violence As Male
Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1116 (2014) (refuting the gender violence claim).
24. Deterrence is typically identified as connected to the punishment side of the crime—
especially the death penalty—and punishment formulation. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note
3, at 11–16; Robert Tanner, Studies Say Death Penalty Deters Crime, WASH. POST (June 11,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/11/AR2007061
100406.html. Given, however, that SYG laws may affect violent crime rates by sanctioning
violence in a larger number of contexts, deterrence seems like a particularly relevant
consideration for actions covered by SYG statutes as well.
25. See Megale, supra note 12, at 1081–83; Nichols, supra note 13; Matt Gertz, ALEC
Has Pushed the NRA‟s “Stand Your Ground” Law Across the Nation, MEDIA MATTERS AM.
(Mar. 21, 2012), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/21/alec-has-pushed-the-nras-standyour-ground-law/186459; Adam Weinstein, How the NRA and Its Allies Helped Spread a
Radical Gun Law Nationwide, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2012/06/nra-alec-stand-your-ground.
26. While at least one commentator indicated that jurisdictions also claimed deterrence
as a justification, see Sullivan Testimony, supra note 13, at 9 (―Proponents of Stand Your
Ground laws often point to public safety and a reduction of crime as evidence of the efficacy
of these laws.‖), the justification does not appear in media claims discussing the law. One
would have expected such a discussion to be prevalent given that the laws were heavily
backed by the NRA and were initially opposed by prosecutors and law enforcement. See
Weaver, supra note 13, at 401–03; Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly
Force in Self Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18 (pointing to NRA backing of the
laws and quoting the Miami police chief as follows: ―Whether it‘s trick-or-treaters or kids
playing in the yard of someone who doesn‘t want them there or some drunk guy stumbling
into the wrong house, . . . you‘re encouraging people to possibly use deadly physical force
where it shouldn‘t be used.‖); Zachary L. Weaver, Killing Shows Flaws of NRA-Backed Law,
CNN (Mar. 23, 2012, 5:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/22/opinion/weaver-floridalaw/.

2015] SOCIAL AND RACIAL EFFECTS OF SELF-DEFENSE LAWS 3185
queried whether enacting SYG reforms could lead to other problematic
social and legal consequences,27 such as troubling racialized differences in
the application of the statutes. A wealth of empirical and scholarly legal
evaluations of criminal justice processes has noted such racial differences.28
One of the claims asserted here, which is informed by a commitment to
eCRT principles, is that it is highly advisable for jurisdictions to consider
potential racialized consequences prior to making dramatic changes in areas
of law where data reflecting significant racial disparities already have been
noted.
This Article lays out a preliminary sketch for a more expansive project
that will assess many aspects of the operation of SYG laws.29 Given the
symposium format and the need to compile more research for the larger
project, the arguments advanced here have more modest goals. Primarily,
this Article seeks to use the SYG revolution to argue that eCRT‘s goal of
calling for the enhanced and nuanced study of race within the disciplines30
can have a real-world impact on law reform. To my mind, there are at least
two basic ways for a legal scholar to ―do‖ eCRT work. First, critical
scholars can leverage empirical work to bolster their theoretical, doctrinal,
normative, and critical claims about how race matters within legal processes
and encounters.31 Second, legal scholars, working alone, or with those who
are typically better trained in social science methodologies, can design and

27. Ohio is an exception. One Ohio legislator unsuccessfully challenged the SYG
reform by citing to evidence of racialized effects. See Jeremy Pelzer, Ohio House Passes
Gun Bill with “Stand Your Ground” Provision After Lengthy Debate, CLEVELAND.COM
(Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2013/11/ohio_house_passes_
gun_bill_wit.html.
28. See infra notes 44, 89–91, 101–07107 and accompanying text.
29. In that larger project, I hope both to design and carry out empirical research and
include a comparative element to assess the evolution of self-defense in other countries with
criminal justice systems emanating from common law traditions.
30. This has been a focal point of the scholarship of the creators and participants within
the eCRT movement. See, e.g., Laura E. Gómez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and
Ideal Links Between Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPENDIUM TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Laura E. Gómez, Looking for
Race in All the Wrong Places, 46 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 221, 225 (2012) [hereinafter Gómez,
Looking for Race] (encouraging social legal scholars to do ―much more to incorporate race
and racism into the core of what we think and write about as law and society scholars‖);
Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 183, 186 (2013) (providing an overview of the genesis of the eCRT project
and stating that a goal of the endeavor was to ―identify the challenges and opportunities
associated with rethinking race scholarship in a manner that reflected the theoretical
orientation put forward by critical race scholarship and also embraced the methodological
contributions of social science research‖); Osagie K. Obasogie, Race in Law and Society: A
Critique, in RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY (Ian Haney López ed., 2006).
31. This form of ―doing‖ eCRT, while potentially advantageous, can also be quite
fraught. As two prominent CRT scholars have stated in a recent article on discussing the
possibilities for collaborations between crits and social scientists, ―[s]ocial science research
has much to offer critical race theorists, including empirical data and theoretical frameworks
that support core CRT ideas. At the same time, we acknowledge that such a collaboration
can potentially undermine CRT‘s core intellectual commitments.‖ Devon W. Carbado &
Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. LAW. SOC. SCI.
149, 150 (2014).
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execute research studies in law.32 While my work has often relied upon the
former approach,33 in the larger project of which this Article is a part, I take
initial steps to formulate a design for the research I believe is necessary to
fully explicate how SYG laws operate.
This Article, however, principally focuses on three elements of the rise of
SYG laws. First, Part I explores justifications for SYG laws by presenting
the results of recent empirical studies of the reforms. In particular, Part I
presents studies both to assess criminal deterrence justifications for SYG
laws and to also query the potential racialized effects produced from the law
reforms. Part I then identifies problems with the current studies, whose
findings, while empirical, still involve interpretation and are not immune
from the blind spots and biases that shape considerations of race in other
contexts. This Part ultimately outlines why future research in the area
should supplement the studies‘ predominant use of quantitative data with a
tool that has been foundational within CRT—narrative methodology.
Exploring SYG case narratives, which may reveal decision making
influenced by negative race stereotypes,34 will help crystalize the myriad
dangers surrounding states‘ expansion of violent forms of self-help. While
the story of the killing of Sherdavia Jenkins did not become the early
catalyst necessary to undo SYG, the story surrounding George
Zimmerman‘s killing of Trayvon Martin—a case like Darling‘s where the

32. There is, of course, a corollary of this principle for those in the research disciplines,
providing that they should consult CRT theories and scholarship to inform how their
research projects are designed, carried out, and assessed. See Gómez, Looking for Race,
supra note 30, at 234–41. A nice example of such is studies that have recently looked at
intersectionality, a concept that critical race theory cofounder Kimberlé Crenshaw
introduced into legal scholarship as a way to discuss law‘s inability to address how multiple
identity traits produce overlapping and reinforcing forms of subordination. See Rachel Kahn
Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO
Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 991 (2011) (using empirical methods to assess the
phenomenon within the employment context); Ange-Marie Hancock, Empirical
Intersectionality: A Tale of Two Approaches, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 259, 260 (2013)
(asserting that the article‘s purpose was to ―examine[] two contrasting empirical
operationalizations of intersectionality theory and suggest[] a series of trade-offs between
them, including preservation of theoretical integrity and current litigational utility‖).
33. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing Stops, Citations, and
Searches in Washington and Beyond, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 673 (2012) (assessing data
collected over five years by a team of researchers from Washington State University that
examined Washington State Patrol traffic stops, citations, and searches); Mario L. Barnes,
Black Women‟s Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of Narrative, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 941 (2006) [hereinafter Barnes, Black Women‟s Stories] (exploring how
socio-legal theories of legal consciousness and narrative are compatible methodologies to
explore the treatment of social identity in criminal cases); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario
L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should
Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (using Bertrand and
Mullainathan‘s résumé research to argue for changes to the reading of Title VII to capture
discrimination based on proxies for race); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, The
Obama Effect: Understanding Emerging Meanings of “Obama” in Anti-Discrimination
Law, 87 IND. L.J. 325 (2012) (using experimental social psychology studies of empowerment
to discriminate against Blacks being linked to moral claims related to Whites endorsing
President Obama).
34. See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
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arguments about the defense pervaded the case, but where SYG was not
ultimately a supposed deciding factor35—did cause critical attention to be
visited upon such statutes. If nothing else, the outcome in the Zimmerman
case proves the power of narratives surrounding even single cases to
significantly galvanize public sentiment.36
Part II analyzes how we might reformulate public opinion around the
advisability of SYG laws. First, Part II suggests that a central takeaway of
the SYG revolution should be that, no matter what new research data reveal,
further law reform or repeal is likely not possible without mechanisms for
political advocacy. Second, Part II attempts to explicate concerns about
SYG laws by analyzing how perceptions of dangerousness are
operationalized under the statutes across race. Through a thought
experiment, this part queries whether support for SYG laws would be as
significant if more citizens were in danger of becoming victims of SYG
violence caused by incorrect perceptions of who is dangerous. Part II
concludes with some thoughts on how the larger project will proceed. At
bottom, a goal of both this Article and the larger project is to force all but
the irredeemable to see SYG reforms as representing another vein in which
we must pose the ostensibly simple question that has too long produced an
unsatisfying answer in this country: What is the value of a black life?37
I. ON THE NECESSITY (OR NOT) OF STAND YOUR GROUND
According to a preliminary report for an in-progress American Bar
Association (ABA) National Task Force Report, as of August 2014, thirty-

35. While SYG may have been the reason George Zimmerman was not initially charged
for killing Trayvon Martin, he did not raise the defense affirmatively in either a pretrial
hearing or during his trial. Still others have remarked that SYG was implicated because of
the jury instructions, which stated Zimmerman had no duty to retreat. See John Rosenthal,
Stand Your Ground Laws or License to Kill Without a Cause?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6,
2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-rosenthal/stand-your-groundlaws_b_3714874.html.
36. The social movement that seeks to confront state-sanctioned violence against black
men, which has adopted the motto, ―Black Lives Matter,‖ was created in response to the
killing of Trayvon Martin. See Jessica Guynn, Three Women, Three Words, A New
Movement, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2015, at 3B (crediting Alicia Garza with creating the
movement through the initiation of the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter); BLACK LIVES MATTER,
http://blacklivesmatter.com/about (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
37. Recent events involving police killings of black boys and young men certainly
bolster this claim. Michael Brown was killed after an altercation with Officer Darren Wilson
in Ferguson, Missouri. See Sandhya Somashekhar & Kimbriell Kelly, Was Michael Brown
Surrendering or Advancing to Attack Officer Darren Wilson?, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2014/11/29/b99ef7a8-75d3-11e4-a755e32227229e7b_story.html. Police in Staten Island, New York, killed Eric Garner by
administering a chokehold, even as he repeatedly stated that he could not breathe. See J.
David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Facing No Charges in Chokehold Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014, at A1. Twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was killed by a Cleveland
police officer as he brandished a toy gun. See Ryllie Danylko, Cleveland Police Officer
Fatally Shoots 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice: The Big Story, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Nov.
25,
2014),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/11/cleveland_police_
officer_fatal.html.
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three states had some version of an SYG law in place.38 Florida‘s law,
however, only might have had a regional impact if not for the efforts of the
ALEC and the NRA. After the passing of Florida‘s law, which was led by
lawmakers with ties to ALEC,39 the two organizations worked together to
create model legislation to facilitate the law being adopted more broadly.40
They provided text that was almost identical to the Florida statute,
including borrowing Florida‘s rationale for the law: ―no person or victim of
crime should be required to surrender his or her personal safety to a
criminal nor should a person or victim of crime be required to needlessly
retreat in the face of intrusion or attack.‖41 At least two key inquiries,
discussed below, were absent from the processes that produced these laws.
First, despite what one might expect prior to changes to criminal statutes,
very few adopting states justified the law reforms based on benefits for
deterring crime—a principal justification for criminal punishment. Like
Florida, many adopters premised their law reform on protecting citizens‘
decisions to violently respond to perceived threats outside of their homes.
As will be explored in the larger project, this goal arguably seems more
connected to privileging personal autonomy, providing certain citizens
dominion over larger swaths of public space42 and encouraging certain
types of masculine gender performance.43 Instead of mimicking Florida‘s
anti-cowardice motive, responsible states should have at least considered

38. See ABA, NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS, PRELIMINARY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (2014) [hereinafter ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT].
39. See Lave, supra note 3, at 836–39; Nichols, supra note 13 (discussing the role of
Florida state Representative Dennis Baxley and state Senator Durell Peadon in passing the
SYG legislation and noting that ―Baxley and Peadon worked closely with NRA lobbyist
Marion Hammer to pass the Florida law . . . . Baxley and Peadon served in the Florida
House and Senate as active members of the American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC), the shadowy Koch brothers-funded network that brings together right-wing
legislators with corporate interests and pressure groups to craft so-called ‗model
legislation‘‖).
40. See Nichols, supra note 13.
41. See Gertz, supra note 25.
42. In essence, the anti-cowardice justification for SYG may represent an effort to mark
who, by law, should be endowed with authority, rights, and privileges in and over certain
spaces. As a comparative example, Australian scholar Ghassan Hage identifies as similar
phenomenon where Whites in Australia understand themselves as ―masters of national
space‖ and ―enactors‖ of law, but where ―ethnics‖ (immigrants) are considered ―objects to be
governed.‖ GHASSAN HAGE, WHITE NATION 16–17 (2000). Socio-legal scholar Kitty
Calavita has previously applied this work to analyzing the interrelation of white, minority,
and immigrant identities within the United States. See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW
AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL LAW 70–72 (2010); Kitty Calavita,
Immigration Law, Race, and Identity, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 1 (2007). I thank Professor
Geoff Ward for bringing this work to my attention.
43. The law reform then serves to legally sanction violence that results from hypermasculinized gender performance. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who‟s the Man?”:
Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671
(2009); Angela P. Harris, Gender Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV.
777, 790–92 (2000). Another scholar has referred to this phenomenon as ―institutionalized
hegemonic violence.‖ Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing
Violence, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (2010). I thank Tulane Law professors Pam
Metzger and Saru Matambanadzo for raising this point.
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relevant data with regard to rates of violent crime within their jurisdictions
and how SYG reforms could be expected to lower those rates. Second,
there was no robust discussion of trends and issues with self-defense
statutes more generally that could be exacerbated by SYG reforms. As it
does within nearly every component of the criminal justice system, race
matters for self-defense statutes. At least since the pathbreaking Baldus
study44—which the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately dismissed as proof of
correlation rather than causation45—we have understood that races of the
perpetrators and victims matter to juries when assessing punishment for
death-eligible defendants. While SYG laws are not punishment reforms,
they do involve legal determinations about when uses of force are justified.
Moreover, post-Baldus, there has been excellent scholarship examining the
operation of race within the context of self-defense laws, especially studies
explicating how race bias informs subjective perceptions about which
people are dangerous and when it is reasonable to respond with force.46
Given that SYG blesses a greater use of force where one perceives a threat,
one would have imagined that these relevant literatures on race and selfdefense would also have been consulted prior to law reform. In fact, some
states are now considering such evidence as a part of their legislative
processes. For example, in Oregon, Connecticut, and Iowa, prior to
enacting legislative changes to criminal laws, lawmakers must review racial
impact statements.47 Minnesota lawmakers observe a similar practice,
although it is not required by state law.48
Although crime control data and potential racialized effects were not
considered prior to the SYG revolution, some initial data of this kind are
presented below to (1) suggest potential justifications for reforming SYG
statutes, and (2) identify the type of studies that can be used in the future to
enhance legislative decision making prior to significant law changes of this
kind.
A. Examining the Empirical Data Thus Far
As a starting point for assessing the advisability and effectiveness of
SYG statutes, a group of recent empirical studies of the law reforms are
next considered. First, these studies are analyzed for their findings on
whether SYG laws deter violence. While the outcomes are disparate, these
studies are particularly important for the larger project moving forward
because they present a range of methods being applied to varied data
sources pertaining to violent crime rates. Second, these studies are reviewed

44. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.,
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).

EQUAL JUSTICE

AND THE

DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL

45. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987).
46. See infra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
47. See Maggie Clark, Should More States Require Racial Impact Statements for New
Laws?, STATELINE (July 30, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2013/07/30/should-more-states-require-racial-impact-statements-fornew-laws.
48. Id.
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for conclusions about whether SYG laws produce problematic racialized
effects. These findings, which principally consider how victim selection
affects whether one is determined to be justified in using violence, however,
are considered within a larger body of empirical and critical work
evaluating connections between identity and claims of self-defense. The
goal of this broader conversation is to facilitate an understanding of how
members of certain racial groups are much more likely to be perceived as
violent, and as such, more likely to become victims of state-sanctioned
violence under SYG.
1. The Conflicted Data on Crime Deterrence
At this point, very few studies have located a deterrent effect of SYG
laws, but the laws have not been summarily debunked as ineffective. While
deterring crime was not the initial stated goal of most of the SYG reforms,
criminal deterrence is a useful way to measure the effectiveness of such
laws. We are early in the genesis of such studies, which may help to
explain why the data are currently conflicted. John Lott, author of More
Guns, Less Crime,49 is an advocate for SYG Laws. While his manuscript
has been significantly criticized for its methods by some within the research
community,50 his research has touted the positive effects on crime control
of conceal and carry laws.51 In recent editions of the text and public
testimony, however, he has also addressed the benefits of SYG laws. He
has been highly critical of the recent work by researchers who found that
SYG laws have no or negative effects on crime control and has claimed that
the racialized effects of the reformed statutes benefit Blacks.52
Currently, only a study by Yue Yu has found a similar positive effect on
crime deterrence. Yu‘s research also does not involve the contested
methods or data used by Lott. Her results, however, are recent, conflict
with the results of other studies described below, and have yet to be vetted
by other researchers. Using ―synthetic matching‖ and ―difference in
difference (DID) identification strategy,‖ she evaluated crime rates in

49. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN
CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000).
50. For example, Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres and Stanford Economics and Law
Professor John Donohue III have significantly criticized the text. See Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1193 (2003); see also John Donohue III et al., Substance Vs. Sideshows in the More Guns,
Less Crime Debate: A Comment on Moody, Lott, and Marvell, 10 ECON. J. WATCH 32
(2013).
51. See, e.g., LOTT, supra note 49, at 51–54; John R. Lott Jr. & David B. Mustard,
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 64
(1997).
52. See “Stand Your Ground” Laws: Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the
Expanded Use of Deadly Force: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3–7 (2013)
(statement of John Lott, President, Crime Prevention Research Ctr.), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-29-13LottTestimony.pdf.
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certain selected U.S. counties between 1995 and 2010.53 She claimed to
find the following:
The results showed that the SYG Law had a positive significant effect on
the decrease in the violent crime rate; indicating that the SYG Law caused
a decrease in the violent crime rate of around 3.5%. The result was
derived after controlling for relevant variables such as youth percentage,
sex ratio, race structure, unemployment rate, and the county and year
fixed effects.54

Yu, however, was measured in assigning meaning to this data, claiming
the following confirming work must be done.
First, research is needed to identify the characteristics of counties that are
more likely to be affected by the SYG law. Second, replication of the
current study using other software packages to perform synthetic
matching is important. Third, future analysis should use all of the
counties to generate more reliable results. 55

Other than Lott and Yu, researchers have either located an ambiguous or
negative effect of SYG laws on criminal deterrence. Yu used the work of
Texas A&M economists Cheng Cheng and Mark Hoekstra as a starting
point for her study, but characterized their results as ambiguous.56 Cheng
and Hoekstra‘s report of their data comparing within-jurisdiction variations
in self-defense laws found that SYG laws do not appear to deter crimes
such as burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault, and by contrast, they result
in a statistically significant 8 percent net increase in the number of reported
murders and non-negligent manslaughters.57 In an unpublished work,
independent researcher Howard Ross Nemerov claims of the Cheng and
Hoekstra research that ―there are a number of errors, assumptions, and
miscalculations in their research that justify revisiting the question of
whether or not Castle Doctrine laws have any impact on crime.‖58 Other
researchers, however, generally have supported Cheng and Hoekstra‘s
claims. For example, using monthly reports of U.S. vital statistics of
firearm-related homicide victimization and applying the ―difference in
difference‖ approach, Georgia State researchers Chandler McClellan and
Erdal Tekin also found that SYG laws were associated with increased

53. Yue Yu, Deterrence Effect of Stand Your Ground Law on Crime in Eastern US
States, 42 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 119 (2014).
54. Id. at 120.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 119.
57. Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime
or Escalate Violence? Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES
821–53 (2013) (using FBI Uniform Crime Reporting data for fifty states from 2000 to 2010,
and applying varied methods, to include difference in difference (DID) for SYG and nonSYG jurisdictions, introducing distributions of placebo effects, and adding control changes
for factors such as economic conditions, welfare spending, and policing intensity).
58. See Howard Ross Nemerov, Do Castle Doctrine Laws Impact Violent Crime? 1
(Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189392.
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homicides.59 In an unpublished study of SYG in Florida, using Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention vital statistics data and a method referred to
as synthetic control—which allows the researchers to mimic what the
change to crime rates would have been in the absence of the SYG law
changes—researchers Abdul Munasib and Mouhcine Guettabi found that
the law reform led to an increase in gun deaths but did not have a
significant impact on violent crimes.60 While there have not been enough
studies that have conducted multiple assessments using similar data and
methods as those claiming that SYG is counterproductive to reducing
crime, the narrative that has emerged in media reports of these studies is
that SYG laws increase homicides.61
2. Empirical Proof of the Costs of Blackness Within Self-Defense Law
a. Racialized Effects of Stand Your Ground Laws?
While the crime control research provides critical data for assessing the
advisability of SYG reforms, another issue with these laws relates to their
potentially racially disparate application. Along with coauthors, I have
previously written that in our now ostensibly ―post-race‖ world, it is
difficult to convince people that disparate racial outcomes arise out the
operation of commonplace (rather than aberrant) animus or societal
structures.62 Still, in keeping with the goals of eCRT, it is important to note
that studies have determined that when we ignore the ways that race
59. Chandler McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and
Injuries 2 (Nat‘l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18187.pdf (data were from 2000 to 2009, and the study
controlled for characteristics such as state racial composition, age distribution, urban
population, unemployment, and poverty).
60. Abdul Munasib & Mouhcine Guettabi, Florida Stand Your Ground Law and Crime:
Did It Make Floridians More Trigger Happy? 1 (Aug. 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2315295 (considering data from 2000 to 2010). At
least one researcher has claimed that this synthetic control method may be superior to
regression methodology for assessing the effects of SYG laws. See Anton Strezhney, Some
More Evidence That Florida‟s „Stand Your Ground‟ Law Increased Firearm Homicide
Rates, CAUSAL LOOP (July 16, 2013), http://causalloop.blogspot.com/2013/07/some-moreevidence-that-floridas-stand.html (describing his own study, which used synthetic control
methodology to determine that between 2006 and 2010 Florida experienced 1 to 1.5 more
homicides per 100,000 due to the SYG law change, and stating that ―[w]hile parametric
regression is an ubiquitous and powerful tool for causal inference, it is a very modeldependent approach. This can sometimes lead to misleading conclusions when the model
gets too far away from the data‖).
61. See, e.g., Marc Fisher & Dan Eggen, „Stand Your Ground‟ Laws Coincide with Jump
in
Justifiable-Homicide
Cases,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
7,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/stand-your-ground-laws-coincide-with-jump-injustifiable-homicide-cases/2012/04/07/gIQAS2v51S_story.html. This is also a central
finding of the ABA Stand Your Ground Task Force. See ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 38, at 10–11.
62. See Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010). Others have made similar claims regarding post-racial
claims masking racially motivated actions and outcomes. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, DOG
WHISTLE POLITICS (2013).
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explicitly matters within processes, bias wins out.63 I suggest that evidence
of how race shapes the experience of individuals within society and the
justice system, more generally, should caution lawmakers from enacting
underanalyzed reforms within the criminal law. In this section, I present a
snapshot of the types of evidence to which I refer. First, however, I will
present the current data regarding how race appears to matter within SYG
jurisdictions.
Perhaps the study that has done the most to test the early racialized
effects of SYG was conducted by John Roman, a senior policy fellow at the
Urban Institute. In recent research using FBI Supplementary Homicide
Report (SHR) data from 2005 to 2010, he found that homicides with a
white perpetrator and a black victim are nearly ten times more likely to be
ruled justified compared to cases with a black perpetrator and a white
victim.64 This gap grows in SYG jurisdictions.65 Moreover, cases with a
white perpetrator and a black victim are 281 percent more likely to be ruled
justified than cases with a white perpetrator and white victim.66 There were
two other interesting points pertaining to the race of the perpetrator/victim
in Roman‘s research for SYG jurisdictions: black on white homicides were
barely half as likely as white on white homicides to be ruled justified, and
black on black homicides statistically have the same chance of being ruled
justified as white on white homicides.67 As part of a PBS report on SYG
laws, Roman also compared 43,500 justified homicides between SYG and
non-SYG states and found similar racial disparities.68
Other racial data has been more conflicted. In the McClellan and Tekin
research referenced above, the researchers found that SYG laws lead to
increased homicides among white males but not black males.69 Oddly,
however, in a part of their research that looked at emergency room visits
rather than deaths, they found a very different racialized effect. In SYG
jurisdictions, for white men there was a nearly 20 percent increase in the
frequency of gun-related injuries that resulted in emergency room visits.70
63. See, e.g., Michael I. Norton et al., Color Blindness and Interracial Interaction:
Playing the Political Correctness Game, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 949 (2006) (discussing studies
revealing that efforts by Whites to be perceived as colorblind have a negative impact on
black-white interactive exercises); Victoria Plaut, 3 Myths Plus a Few Best Practices for
Achieving Diversity, SCI. AM. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/3myths-plus-a-few-best-practices-for-achieving-diversity (presenting studies in which
colorblind approaches increased racial tensions rather than reducing implicit bias).
64. JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INST., RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR
GROUND LAWS: ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 7 tbl.2 (2013),
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412873-stand-your-ground.pdf.
65. See id. at 6–7 & tbl.2.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id.
68. See Sarah Childress, Is There Racial Bias in “Stand Your Ground” Laws?, PBS
FRONTLINE (July 31, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminaljustice/is-there-racial-bias-in-stand-your-ground-laws. In the PBS data, in non-SYG states,
Whites who kill Blacks are 250 percent more likely to be found justified than Whites who
kill Whites; in SYG states that number jumps to 354 percent. See id.
69. McClellan & Tekin, supra note 59, at 7.
70. Id. at 30.
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For black women, however, the increase was roughly 60 percent.71 The
authors had no real explanation for this anomaly.72
As Florida is ground zero for SYG reform, a robust empirical assessment
of SYG laws, to include race effects, would be very important data.
Unfortunately, the best data with regard to race and SYG in Florida are
quite insightful, but they are neither scholarly in nature nor strongly
empirical. Still, the data, which were compiled in investigative reports by
two sets of Tampa Bay Times writers, are helpful to review based upon the
comprehensive picture they paint.73 Looking at all identifiable SYG cases
in Florida at the times their reports were completed, the authors describe
two phenomena. In the first report, the authors found that a large number of
people who successfully invoked SYG had histories of violence, with more
than 60 percent of them having been arrested at least once prior to the time
they killed someone and invoked SYG.74 The second report indicated that
success with invoking SYG was connected to the race of the victim. With
regard to the cases reviewed, the authors wrote:
A Tampa Bay Times analysis of nearly 200 cases—the first to examine
the role of race in ―stand your ground‖—found that people who killed a
black person walked free 73 percent of the time, while those who killed a
white person went free 59 percent of the time. 75

With regard to perpetrators, however, Blacks fared slightly better than
Whites under SYG: ―Overall, black defendants went free 66 percent of the
time in fatal cases compared to 61 percent for white defendants—a

71. Id.
72. Id. at 30 n.40 (acknowledging that this substantial increase in injuries among black
women is consistent with the hypothesis that SYG laws lead to more violence, especially for
this group, but is inconsistent with the authors‘ analysis of SYG‘s effects on homicides).
73. Kameel Stanley & Connie Humburg, Many Killers Who Go Free with Florida
„Stand Your Ground‟ Law Have History of Violence, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 21, 2012, 4:30
AM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/many-killers-who-go-free-withflorida-stand-your-ground-law-have-history/1241378. More recently, there has been an
empirically focused preliminary report that builds upon the Tampa Bay Times research in
Florida. Looking at 307 SYG cases, the report seeks to tabulate ―various aspects, variables,
and factors associated with Florida‘s Stand Your Ground law and its enforcement,‖ but fails
to consider the impact of race. See Albert E. McCormick Jr., The Enforcement of Florida‟s
“Stand Your Ground” Law: Preliminary Findings, 6 J. PUB. & PROF. SOC. 1, 22–24 (2014).
The report cautions that the findings must be tempered because of the secondary nature of
the media sources used to identify SYG cases. See id. at 2.
74. Stanley & Humburg, supra note 73.
75. Susan Taylor Martin, Kris Hundley & Connie Humburg, Race Plays Complex Role
in Florida „Stand Your Ground‟ Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 2, 2012, 1:00 PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/race-plays-complex-role-in-floridas-standyour-ground-law/1233152. The report appropriately indicated that the number of cases
reviewed could not support causation claims and also included interesting insights such as
charges were often not filed in mixed race cases, and that while black victims were more
often carrying weapons when killed, there were also ―many cases where people went free
after killing a black victim under questionable circumstances.‖ Id.
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difference explained, in part, by the fact blacks were more likely to kill
another black.‖76
The findings of the Tampa Bay Times reports are troublesome for a
number of reasons. First, they suggest that the population primarily seeking
to benefit from SYG is not the innocent victims legislatures were ostensibly
attempting to empower. Second, both the Tampa Bay Times reports and
John Roman‘s research continue to demonstrate how black and white lives
are differentially valued in this country.77 Finally, Tampa Bay Times data
portend an anomaly that few researchers have cogently articulated: because
most violence is historically intra- rather than interracial,78 if one controls
for other discriminatory practices within the criminal justice system, SYG
should tend to favor black killers over time.79 This is so for the unfortunate
reason that victims of black offenders more often will be black. To be more
specific, and perhaps as Trayvon Martin demonstrated, young black men
are likely to be the most vulnerable and least vindicated of victims.80 While
one could argue about the systemic benefits to Blacks of this unfortunate
happenstance, to do so would seem to at least implicitly accept the
diminished value assigned to black lives.
76. Id. The Tampa Bay Times report also tracked cases for Hispanic victims, but
indicated such victims only made up seven percent of the cases and acknowledged that
police may have misidentified some Hispanic victims as black or white. Id.
77. See supra notes 64–68. This difference in valuing black and white lives has been
demonstrated in other studies. In addition to the Baldus study—which analyzed death
penalty sentences—a similar phenomenon was seen in a study of vehicular homicide cases.
See Edward Glaesser & Bruce Sacerdote, The Determinants of Punishment: Deterrence,
Incapacitation and Vengeance (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1894,
Apr.
2000),
available
at
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/the_
determinants_of_punishment_deterrence_incapacitation_and_vengeance.pdf. In a study of
drivers who accidentally killed others, drivers who killed women received sentences that
were 56 percent longer, while drivers who killed Blacks received sentences that were 53
percent shorter. Id. at 1.
78. See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA SMITH, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 11–12 (2011),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf. The data indicated that
between the years of 1980–2008, Blacks were disproportionately represented among victims
and offenders and 93 percent of black victims were killed by black offenders. Id.; see also
Patrik Johnson, Racial Bias and „Stand Your Ground‟ Laws: What the Data Show,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/
2013/0806/Racial-bias-and-stand-your-ground-laws-what-the-data-show (―While blacks
represent 12 percent of the US population, they make up 55 percent of its homicide victims,
the vast majority of those perpetrated by other blacks.‖).
79. See supra notes 76–77. I thank Georgetown Law Professor Paul Butler for pushing
me to address this aspect of the SYG data. Others have similarly claimed that SYG statutes
are good for women who will be sanctioned to use greater force when fighting off sexual
violence. See Coker, supra note 3, at 949 (stating but not advocating this point); cf. Franks,
supra note 23, at 1116.
80. See Vickie M. Mays et al., Using the Science of Psychology to Target Perpetrators
of Racism and Race-Based Discrimination for Intervention Efforts: Preventing Another
Trayvon Martin Tragedy, 5 J. SOC. ACTION COUNS. PSYCHOL. 11, 19 (2013). Additionally,
irrespective of socioeconomic class, studies have shown that black and Latino boys are
exposed to more violence. See Julie L. Crouch et al., Income, Race/Ethnicity, and Exposure
to Violence in Youth: Results from the National Survey of Adolescents, 28 J. COMM.
PSYCHOL. 625, 632 (2000).
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While these early studies are starting to fill in needed data on the
operation of race in SYG jurisdictions, currently the results are
inconclusive. Depending on which study or report one reads, with regard to
SYG, race either matters not at all,81 in counter-normative ways,82 or
precisely in the way one might imagine given the disproportionately
negative consequences that typically attach to race in the criminal justice
system.83 Reconciling this uneven landscape of how race matters within
SYG jurisdictions, or who has ―standing‖ to stand their ground, will be a
part of my larger project. As I have attempted to demonstrate here, the
research needed to explicate the role of race in SYG jurisdictions must pay
close attention to the effects of both the myriad sources of data on violent
crimes and the plural methodologies selected to assess them. The goal is
not to ―cherry pick‖ the research most helpful to a CRT focus.84 Rather,
scholars engaged in eCRT work need to fully understand both the
interrelation of the studies and what they portend, as a group, if they wish to
appropriately contextualize their critical legal analysis. While this
undertaking is vital, I recently have been reminded that whatever the
research ultimately reveals regarding the connection between SYG laws and
race, it is certainly the case that undoing the SYG law reform would not
necessarily remove racially disparate results from claims of self-defense.85
b. Studying the Meaning of Race to Self-Defense More Broadly
This data described above are crucial for a number of reasons. First,
beyond the facts that intra-racial murder rates are higher, African

81. See Yu, supra note 53 (using a control group in her study that considered the effects
of racial categories but reporting no findings in the study).
82. See supra notes 53, 78 (describing claims based on the Florida data that SYG
benefits Blacks), 71–74 (finding that SYG laws created significant negative effects for the
homicide rate for white men and gun-related injury rates for white men and black women).
83. See supra notes 64–66, 73 (detailing the how SYG laws create significant negative
outcomes for black victims). One of the goals of the larger project is to expand the
consideration of the effects of race in SYG research so that it more meaningfully includes
the study of a greater number of groups and is not so heavily focused on comparisons
between Blacks and Whites. For a critique that race studies too often become fixated on a
black/white binary paradigm, see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race:
The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997).
84. See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 31, at 162.
85. As the U.S. Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), opined, one
of the issues of trying to correct racially disparate results in the criminal justice system is that
they permeate every juncture of the system. Id. at 312. I thank Duke University Sociology
Professor Eduardo Bonilla-Silva for pressing me to address this point. Professor Aya Gruber
has recently emphasized that irrespective of the SYG law reforms that racial disparity in the
criminal justice system exists largely because of the operation of discretion. See Aya Gruber,
Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 961, 965 (2014) (―It is thus possible that repealing stand your ground will
increase Florida murder convictions generally, but leave untouched, or possibly even
exacerbate, racial disparities.‖ (citation omitted)). For powerful and formative work on the
connection between discretion and racially disparate outcomes within the criminal justice
system, see ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2007).
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Americans are disproportionately more often victims of violent crime.86
Second, poor communities where people of color disproportionately reside
are plagued with greater rates of violence.87 Third, men and women of
color are more likely to be perceived as dangerous and threatening, even
when engaging in ambiguous or nonviolent conduct.88 Critical race
scholars would insist that this lived experience should be accounted for
when jurisdictions consider measures that authorize state-sanctioned
violence in a greater number of contexts. As a shaping influence, eCRT
advocates and studies need to supply work that translates these experiences
into actionable data.
Thus, social psychology studies that focus more broadly on the
experience of minorities within the criminal justice system form an
essential element to fully explicating how SYG laws work. As mentioned
above, the Baldus study was an early example of how the races of the
perpetrator and victims can lead to differential punishment, even under
circumstances where no intentional racism or bias are identified.89 Recent
MacArthur ―Genius Grant‖ recipient and Stanford law and psychology
professor Jennifer Eberhardt has done consistently excellent work seeking
to answer such questions.90 One recent report by Professor Eberhardt and
her colleagues has sought to explain the relevance of the social
psychological studies that contain germane lessons for interracial SYG
ground encounters. Specifically, the report articulates how the implicit
forms of racial bias we see in other portions of the criminal justice system
are operationalized within the SYG context.91 For example, numerous

86. See supra note 78. I consider this data point to be an example of what University of
Southern California Law Professor Jody Armour has described as the black tax—―the price
Black people pay in their encounters with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black
stereotypes.‖ JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13 (1997).
87. This phenomenon appears to be true globally as well as domestically. See Kira
Zalan, How Violence Perpetuates Poverty: The Struggle to Get Out of Poverty Is
Relentlessly Undermined by Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:00 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/03/14/how-violence-perpetuates-poverty.
88. For example, in a now widely known study using University of California Irvine
undergraduates, white observers perceived slight and ―ambiguous‖ shoves as more violent
when performed by Blacks. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and
Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595–96 (1976).
89. See David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review
of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
90. See, e.g., R. Rick Banks, Jennifer Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and
Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2006); Jennifer
Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181 (2005) (reviewing neuroimaging studies
related to race); Jennifer Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality
of Black Defendants Predicts Death Penalty Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006)
[hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy]; Jennifer Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black:
Race, Crime and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004)
[hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black].
91. See ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 30.
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studies finding that Blacks are thought to be more criminal,92 threatening,93
and violent,94 explain why Blacks would be more likely to be victims under
statutes where a perception of threat supplies the justification for using
force.95 Of course, the perception of threat is also germane for standard
self-defense claims. SYG becomes more dangerous because it authorizes
greater uses of force in a larger set of contexts. A helpful overview of many
studies that look at the role of race in assessing threat is supplied in the
ABA Task Force report.96
Empirical assessments are not the only ones that are germane to
explicating the meaning of race within self-defense doctrines. A number of
legal scholars have sought to identify the myriad and sophisticated ways
that race shapes outcomes within the context of criminal law. For example,
at the same time Baldus was examining racial differences in death penalty
rates, University of Hawaii Law Professor Charles Lawrence, relying on
insights from social science wrote the germinal CRT article, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.97 There,
92. For excellent overviews of the longstanding hyper-criminalization of Blacks in the
United States, which has roots in post-emancipation practices and continues through today‘s
drug enforcement policies, see MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: CONTINUING
AMERICAN DILEMMA 6–9 (2012). These broad claims are backed by results from more
discrete empirical studies of race and crime. See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra
note 90, at 888 (finding that, when asked, ―Who looks criminal?,‖ police officers identified
Blacks more often than Whites); id. at 879–80 (finding that subjects were able to discern
degraded visuals of weapons more quickly when they were associated with a black face);
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to
Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 403 (2003) (finding that
subjects were response-biased, providing weapon-appropriate responses more readily to
Blacks than Whites); Barbara Watson et al., Drug Use and African Americans: Myth Versus
Reality, 40 J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 19 (1995) (finding that respondents, including police
officers, identified Blacks over 95 percent of the time when they were asked who is the
typical illicit drug user).
93. See Joshua Correl et al., The Police Officer‟s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1320 (2002) (examining policy and community-member race-based responses to
potentially threatening people and finding a ―shooter‘s bias‖ where putative black
perpetrators are shot more quickly and frequently).
94. See Duncan, supra note 88. Interestingly, the study results finding that Blacks are
perceived as more violent were reproduced with sixth grade subjects. See Andrew Sagar &
Janet Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children‟s Perceptions of
Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 (1980).
95. Stereotypes associating Blacks and crime are so strong that studies have found
subjects may change previously assigned racial classifications when primed with racespecific stereotypes. See generally Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Racial Fluidity
and Inequality in the United States, 118 AM. J. SOC. 676 (2012) (finding that, when
identified as unemployed, jailed, or receiving government assistance, racially ambiguous
individuals are more likely to be identified as black, even if they were not previously
identified as black).
96. ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 38.
97. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection]. More recently, Professor Lawrence has commented on his original
article and the body of unconscious bias research that has arisen in its wake. See Charles R.
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he provided a devastating critique of legal standards requiring that
remediable racial bias could only be proven through intent or purpose.98
McCleskey v. Kemp,99 the Supreme Court opinion which dismissed
Baldus‘s work as only reflecting a correlation,100 was such a case in the
criminal law area. Since Professor Lawrence wrote his article, there have
been many scholarly articles that have more generally considered how
processes such as implicit bias factor into policing and other criminal
justice processes.101 Jody Armour‘s work on self-defense and reasonable
racism was a strong early entrant in this area.102 More recently, UC Irvine
Law professor Song Richardson‘s work, alone, and with social scientists,
has made a meaningful contribution. For example, her work on arrest
efficiency or ―hit rates‖ for police stops, which borrows from theories of
implicit social cognition, is an example of work challenging unconscious
bias in policing.103 Additionally, her work with UCLA social psychologist
Phillip Goff has been instrumental in articulating how unconscious
processes can lead to mistaken beliefs about criminality, a concept they
define as the ―suspicion heuristic.‖104 With regard to the operation of this
heuristic, the authors identify how the heuristic disadvantages Blacks, who
―serve as our mental prototype (i.e. stereotype) for the violent street
criminal.‖105
Within the self-defense context, Richardson and Goff‘s work builds on
existing scholarship on normative understandings of reasonableness that has
been extremely influential. George Washington Law professor Cynthia
Lee‘s work has both identified the existence of racial bias in reasonableness
assessments in self-defense, and queried how courts should account for
it.106 Most recently she has specifically explored these issues within the
Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of the
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, 40 CONN. L. REV. 931 (2008).
98. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 97, at 318. An
important case relying on this articulation of the necessity of intent, is Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), which denied the availability of constitutional redress for state-based
racial disadvantage without proof of discriminatory intent on the part of state actors, despite
the presence of disparate racial impact. Id. at 239–41.
99. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
100. Id. at 292–97.
101. See, e.g., Charles Ogletree et al., Coloring Punishment: Implicit Social Cognition
and Criminal Justice, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 45 (Justin D. Levinson &
Robert Smith eds., 2012).
102. See ARMOUR, supra note 86, at 19–27. For a recent claim that Professor Armour‘s
theory captures the racial dynamics of SYG encounters, see D. Marvin Jones, “He‟s a Black
Male . . . Something Is Wrong with Him!” The Role of Race in the Stand Your Ground
Debate,” 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025, 1029–30 (2014).
103. See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2035 (2011); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87
IND. L.J. 1143 (2011).
104. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic,
98 IOWA L. REV. 293 (2013).
105. Id. at 310.
106. See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); Cynthia Lee, Race and Self-Defense:
Toward a
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996). To the extent this
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context of the George Zimmerman case.107 From an eCRT perspective this
work is important because it is critical race work—like this Article—that
heavily leans on insights from social science research. It is also important
in other ways that make it different from the largely quantitative studies of
SYG above. First, critical work that is empirically focused, still often seeks
to proscriptively encourage change at the site of study or comment—
something that may or may not be a goal of empirical work. In other
words, where some empirical work just seeks to expose ―what is,‖ critical
race work is often as focused on calling for a specific intervention as it is
interested in demystification. Another way of capturing this difference is to
suggest that empirical work focuses heavily upon locating statistical
significance whereas critical work is far more concerned with the impact or
societal effects of such measurements. Second, critical work seeks to
represent missing stories and identify the ways that law may be complicit in
ordering unfair arrangements that disenfranchise certain groups. The next
section suggests how these two CRT goals require additional methods to be
considered in order for the social science research to more fully capture
how race matters in SYG jurisdictions.
B. Missing Data: The Call for Stories
While the data above provide a quantitative overview of outcomes under
SYG laws, they do not provide a complete picture of how these laws are
experienced, especially across race. There are missing stories and this is
important because narratives shape our world.108 The introduction of
narratives has also served as an important methodological tool for CRT
scholars.109 As UCLA Law Dean and Professor Rachel Moran has stated:
Another crossroad for critical race theory is determining whether it shares
a unifying methodology. Methodological coherence could be especially
important if the field‘s substantive focus grows increasingly far-flung. At
present, critical race theorists deploy a variety of techniques, ranging from
relatively traditional analyses of law and policy to interdisciplinary and
historical treatments. Even so, the most striking approach is narrative, a
method pioneered by feminist legal theorists and embraced by many
prominent race scholars.110

work has heavily relied upon interrogating commonplace but biased understandings, it has
been pushed forward by recent work with a greater focus on rooting out antiracist sentiments
in normative reasonableness assessments. See, e.g., Jonathan Markovitz, “Spectacle of
Slavery Unwilling to Die”: Curbing Reliance Upon Racial Stereotyping in Self-Defense
Cases, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
107. See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not
Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013). She has also looked at reasonableness
and unconscious bias within the context of manslaughter laws and queried how courts should
respond to gay panic defenses. See LEE, supra note 106, at 203–75; Cynthia Lee, The Gay
Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008).
108. See ARMOUR, supra note 86.
109. See Barnes, Black Women‟s Stories, supra note 33, at 951–58.
110. Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365,
2378–79 (2003).
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First-person narratives capturing precisely how those inhabiting minority
identities fare within the criminal justice system would ideally be used.111
Such narratives are important because numbers alone rarely capture the full
breadth of lived experience of any study‘s subjects. For marginalized
populations, who may be at once mischaracterized and ignored within
research studies and the formal localities where law is created and
contested,112 narrative becomes a tool to preserve and present a different
world view.113 While narrative as a method has been severely criticized
within legal scholarship,114 the relevance and utility of stories also has been
a bit of sticking point between critical scholars and socio-legal scholars.115
Critical scholars, however, have traditionally advocated personal stories as
a means to elucidate the types of identity-based disadvantage that may be
overlooked when one considers the meaning of statistically significant, but
not shockingly large, racial disparities.116 These stories also have been
acknowledged by socio-legal researchers as a means for assessing the legal

111. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 9. 1996),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/the-bloods-and-the-crits (indicating that, in its
weakest form, the call for the use of narrative is ―nothing more than a proposal for
broadening the narratives available to judges and juries, to help them get (quite literally) to
the bottom of things‖).
112. For two outstanding examples of how judicial or formal responses to one‘s personal
story—which is often the very source of information upon which legal proceedings
expound—can be shaped by a speaker‘s race and gender identity, see Patricia Ewick &
Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal
Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992) (describing the story of how black female
research subject, Millie Simpson, was ignored within her criminal legal proceedings); Lucie
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the author‘s attempts to change a black female
welfare recipient‘s story about how she spent overpaid funds in order to give her a better
chance of prevailing in an administrative proceeding).
113. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others, A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1987); Leslie Espinoza & Angela Harris, Afterword:
Embracing the Tar Baby, LATCRIT Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
1585 (1997).
114. See Barnes, Black Women‟s Stories, supra note 33 (describing the history of attacks
upon the use of stories in critical race and feminist legal scholarship); Carbado & Roithmayr,
supra note 31, at 161–62 (pointing out that the centrality of narrative to CRT has been
contested and discussing the claims of Judge Richard Posner and Professors Daniel Farber
and Suzanna Sherry, prominent critics of storytelling within legal scholarship).
115. For some insight into efforts to import the critical meaning of stories into socio-legal
discourse, see Mario L. Barnes, Racial Paradox in a Law and Society Odyssey, 44 LAW &
SOC‘Y REV. 469 (2010) (responding to the personal stories of the author‘s encounters with
race throughout his life in Professor Richard Lempert‘s Law and Society Association
presidential address); Charles Lawrence III, Listening for Stories in All the Right Places:
Narrative and the Racial Formation Theory, 46 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 247 (2012) (responding
to the lack of personal stories in Professor Laura Gómez‘s Law and Society presidential
address).
116. For example, data detailing differential rates of invoking SYG may not be nearly as
impactful as three post-Zimmerman trial examples of African Americans unsuccessful in
their SYG claims, with facts to which many would be sympathetic. See Annie-Rose Strasser,
With Racial Roles Reversed, Three Self-Defense Cases That Went the Other Way,
THINKPROGRESS (July 15, 2013, 9:50 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2013/07/15/
2297541/self-defense-zimmerman.
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attitudes and legal consciousness of the marginalized.117
Second,
prominent scholars have asserted that when social scientists do not
intentionally or explicitly focus their inquiries on race, their methods—
which typically eschew multicultural approaches—are less trustworthy.118
For these reasons, one goal of my larger project is to design a qualitative
component for SYG studies. Such an endeavor would not only be
completely consistent with the goals of CRT, it comports with an exciting
trend in recent socio-legal research, which includes qualitative, often
narrative, components alongside quantitative data. For example, in studies
focusing on punishing welfare recipients,119 explicating anti-integration
violence,120 interrogating police stops,121 and understanding how litigants
experience employment discrimination litigation,122 we have seen
interviews leveraged in remarkably effective ways.
Thus far, none of the SYG studies have included a robust qualitative
component, which could be achieved by including interviews with alleged
perpetrators, victims and their families, politicians, lawyers, judges, and
other legal actors. In some jurisdictions, the best we could do to locate this
type of information would be to search media accounts for ostensible SYG
cases.123 These accounts, in turn, may outline issues within the cases that
may be otherwise missed because the laws include bars to criminal
prosecution and civil suits. A study by Albert McCormick that reviewed
307 SYG cases, however, cautions on the dangers of using media reports
and other secondary sources in empirical work.124 Here, the use does not
seek to quantify certain factors related to SYG cases. Rather, these
accounts could be used descriptively to provide information on how
117. See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
118. See generally WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY
(Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008).
119. See generally KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011) (using interviews with welfare recipients in
California to capture their understanding of rule breaking).
120. See generally JEANINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING (2013) (augmenting her study of
incidents of move-in violence with interviews of victims).
121. See generally CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE
AND CITIZENSHIP (2014) (including interviews in an empirical study of police stops in
Kansas City metropolitan area); see also Barnes & Chang, supra note 33, at 683–85
(averring that the focus group interviews with state troopers may help to contextualize
discriminatory views not otherwise noted within traffic stop data collected in Washington
state).
122. See generally Ellen Berry et al., Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness
and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 1 (2012).
For 1788 employment discrimination cases between 1988 and 2003, the researchers
interviewed over 100 of plaintiffs‘ and defendants‘ representatives, to assess whether the
parties viewed discrimination law as fair. See id. at 3.
123. This appears to have been what was done in other recent studies. See BELL, supra
note 120; EPP ET AL., supra note 121, at 172 (building sample of interviewed respondents in
part from drivers who had reported being stopped by police in an initial survey).
124. See McCormick, supra note 73, at 2. Other researchers have pointed out that, with
narratives culled from media reports, it is difficult to discern whether the stories are
―extreme and unusual.‖ EPP ET AL., supra note 121, at 21.
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individual complications of SYG laws are experienced in a manner that
may otherwise evade discovery. Unless and until researchers include
interviews, surveys, focus groups with key SYG actors, etc., these media
reports may be one of the few tools available for gathering richer details
regarding which persons can and cannot stand their ground. Such stories
have the potential to have a powerful impact on law reform. While few
outside of South Florida have heard of the story of Sherdavia Jenkins, no
one in America escaped the media frenzy around the Trayvon Martin case.
That case has done much to educate the public about the complicated racial
dynamics that can play out in SYG jurisdictions and has directly led to
efforts to repeal the reform in Florida. Amassing many more such
compelling stories from a larger number of states likely will be necessary to
press legislators to reconsider the legal efficacy of such laws.
II. THE WAY FORWARD: UNDOING POLITICAL CAPTURE AND
INTRODUCING THE SYG ―BOOMERANG‖
While I contend that understanding the data above and collecting more
and different data is necessary to assess the merits of SYG laws, ultimately,
any move away from current statutes will involve convincing policymakers
of the laws‘ potential danger. For this task, perhaps only the criminal
deterrence data will matter. Findings regarding racial disparities may prove
less convincing to a society that has essentially declared itself to be postrace, despite significant statistics suggesting race still matters in most
important areas of American life.125 Additionally, recent polls have
identified the widely disparate views held across different races about SYG
laws. In a poll conducted in the aftermath of the Trayvon Martin case,
Blacks and Whites expressed differing views on the relevance of SYG laws
to the case.126 For Blacks, 73 percent believe George Zimmerman would
have been charged sooner had Trayvon Martin been white, while only 33
percent of Whites hold this view.127 There are also differing views across
race on whether George Zimmerman was guilty, and 52 percent of Whites
believe race played no part in the case.128 Even with robust crime
deterrence data, attitudes such as these demonstrate why it will be a difficult
task to gain broad-based support for the repeal of SYG laws. Below, I
suggest two strategies—one political and one a thought experiment—that
may contribute to the efforts to at least encourage states to revisit SYG
laws.

125. See Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 62, at 982–92.
126. See Yamiche Alcindor, Poll Shows Racial Divide on Views of Trayvon Martin Case,
USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2012, 12:53 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/
2012-04-05/trayvon-martin-poll/54047512/1.
127. Id.
128. Id. Blacks, however, do not uniformly reject SYG laws. See Weathersbee, supra
note 9 (citing a Quinnipiac study that indicated 37 percent of Blacks favored SYG, while 57
percent opposed it).
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A. SYG and Political Capture
Although SYG laws have gained a strong foothold, consistent with
former Attorney General Holder‘s comments that began this Article, many
argue that the SYG reforms were attempts to find solutions where no real
problems existed. As there was no crime control justification used to back
the law reforms, states modified their laws based principally on the strength
of NRA and ALEC narratives about empowering victims who were
insufficiently protected under standard self-defense statutes. Because most
states do not require racial impact data prior to adopting new criminal laws,
little attention was paid to the potential for disparate racial consequences
under the new laws. Recently, there have been some efforts to investigate
the efficacy of SYG laws. In October 2013, for example, the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee held hearings on the public safety implications of
SYG laws.129 More recently, in May 2014, the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission began a national study of whether SYG laws promote racial
bias.130 It is not clear, however, that even national efforts such as this will
cause adopting states to reconsider these laws. Based on the success of this
campaign to promulgate SYG laws and the NRA‘s earlier campaign to
spread conceal and carry laws, one can only surmise that reforming SYG
laws will require progressive organizations to expend similar political
capital. So, creating comprehensive data regarding the potential dangers of
the statutes is only a first step in undoing SYG laws. Each state will need to
be sold on a message of repeal or amendment, which past experience
suggests will have the best opportunity for success when the message is
orchestrated by organizations that also can explain important data and
convince state lawmakers why SYG is so problematic.
The likely suspects for undoing the political capture that proliferated
SYG would be organizations that advocate for civil rights and civil
liberties. This list likely would include groups such as the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal
Defense Fund, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
the National Urban League, American Civil Liberties Union, and many
other more regional organizations that focus on racial justice.131 There are
other organizations, however, with access to the data and resources to
intervene. For example, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation and Brennan Center for Social Justice recently held a
roundtable at New York University. The goal of the meeting was to
identify strategies for reducing the jail population in the United States. At
129. See Sullivan Testimony, supra note 13.
130. See John R. Lott Jr., Right to Stand Your Ground Transcends Race and Politics,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-standyour-ground-hearings-101614-20141015-story.html.
131. While it would be impractical to include all the entities to which this description
pertains, additional examples include the Equal Justice Society, Equal Justice Initiative,
Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Lawyers‘ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
(which exists in a number of cities). One might also imagine an advocacy role for
professional organizations, such as the American Bar Association—which is already
considering the SYG issue—and the American Medical Association.
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that meeting, I challenged the group conveners to consider a role for their
organizations as policy advocates for social science evidence proving the
public safety crisis burgeoning around SYG laws. Not until organizations
of this kind turn their energies toward spreading information about reform
will there be an opportunity to undo the political capture the NRA and
ALEC perfected.
B. SYG and the Theory of the “Boomerang”
While connections between SYG statutes and increased homicide rates
are important, helping states to realize the full breadth of the potentially
negative consequences of SYG laws will not be easy without more vivid
examples. The narratives I advocate for, including in future studies, could
provide potentially salient examples. Certainly, one would hope that being
confronted with many stories like those involving Sherdavia Jenkins and
Trayvon Martin would have some ability to shift public sentiments. A more
compelling opportunity for intervening exists around the important issue of
SYG laws authorizing increased violence against people perceived as
dangerous—also known as, according to previously assessed studies,132
young black and brown men. As I argued above, disproportionately
negative consequences for black and brown men and others for whom
stereotypes related to violence attach are unlikely to spur a majority of
legislatures to rethink the merits of the statutes. I, however, have been
working through a thought experiment that may make the disparate
consequences experienced by men of color more real for everyone. My
premise is that SYG laws are so unobjectionable because a great many
citizens are not worried about being misperceived as threatening under the
statutes.133 In SYG jurisdictions then, you are likely to be deemed justified
in using force when you injure or kill certain people of color. Again, this is
why the ability to successfully invoke SYG, is tied to the race of the victim.
My goal would be to dislodge this particular side effect of negative
stereotypes, by making reliance on such stereotypes more punitive for
everyone. A perverse way to force everyone to deal with consequences of
certain victims being perceived as more dangerous, would be to suggest that
misperceptions of violence should be read to empower those perceived as
more violent to use violence first.
In other words, a person‘s
misperceptions about another person being violent are visited back upon
132. See supra notes 88, 92–96.
133. For similar reasons, I have previously argued that many Americans have not
protested against the U.S. government‘s post-9/11 civil liberties encroachments; as people
unlikely to be regarded as suspected terrorists, many do not see the laws as imposing
consequences for them. See Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman, Entering Unprecedented
Terrain: Charting a Method to Reduce Madness in Post-9/11 Power and Rights Conflicts,
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 391–94 (2008). Poll results confirm this phenomenon. For
example, prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, 80 percent of
Americans claimed that they opposed ethnic profiling. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 953, 974 n.86 (2002) (citing Gallup poll). After the terrorist attacks, 60 percent of
Americans were in favor of ethnic profiling, ―as long as it was directed against Arabs and
Muslims.‖ Id. at 974 n.88 (citing the New York Times).
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them because the person wrongly thought to be violent could use the danger
created by the stereotypical assignment as a justification to act even earlier.
A poignant example of applying this approach can be demonstrated through
Jody Armour‘s work. In a 1994 Stanford Law Review article, Race Ipsa
Loquitor, Professor Armour provided a scenario where a white woman shot
a black man in line with her at an ATM machine because she perceived him
(incorrectly) as dangerous, when he reached for his billfold.134 Under the
approach I present here, understanding the woman‘s irrational fear based on
stereotypes of black criminality, the black man at the ATM would be
empowered to use violence first—perhaps, even before she brandished a
pistol. In a crude sense, his doing so would be tantamount to the
anticipatory or preemptive self-defense approach the United States has
recently observed in the national security context.135
I call this approach of empowering certain putative victims to respond
violently before they have become actual victims a ―boomerang‖ theory. I
do so because these scenarios represent instances where the consequences
of someone‘s misperception about violence based on stereotypes is visited
back upon them. Clearly this approach is dangerous and inadvisable.136 It
is the equivalent strategy of seeking to correct racially disparate results in
the administration of the death penalty by advocating the killing of more

134. Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 781–82 (1994).
135. See generally Anthony C. Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of
Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89 (2003) (defining and assessing the legality of the doctrine). Some
would argue that a justification similar to ―boomerang‖ has been tried and failed under SYG.
For example, in Long Island, New York, John White was convicted of second-degree
manslaughter for killing a seventeen-year-old boy, Daniel Cicciaro, who was with a group of
boys who came to his house to challenge his son to a fight. He considered the boys—who
brandished no weapons but were shouting racial epithets and threats—to be a ―lynch mob‖
and claimed he was reminded of the racial violence his family experienced in the Deep
South. See Corey Kilgannon, Sentence Commuted in Racially Charged Killing, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/nyregion/24commute.html?_r=0.
While the court rejected White‘s self-defense claim, Governor Paterson commuted his
sentence after he served five months in prison. Id. A form of the preemptive self-defense
claim already has been mostly rejected by courts in the context of severely abused women
who claimed self-defense when they shot their sleeping husbands. See, e.g., State v.
Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan.
1988); see also Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457, 457–58 (2006) (arguing that the cases where abused women kill
sleeping husbands involve a form of ―nonconfrontational ‗self-defense‘ homicide,‖ which
should not be deemed morally justifiable).
136. It is not to say that the approach is absolutely unimaginable because persons who
unreasonably fear black and brown men often receive a benefit but no disadvantage from
their misperceptions. It is, however, probably unworkable as a standard, and certainly
morally repugnant. See infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. In a way, the approach is
reminiscent of Professor Richard Delgado‘s rotten social background defense which argued
that we should excuse criminal behavior for those who have suffered from extreme
socioeconomic deprivation. See Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the
Criminal Law Recognize the Defense of Extreme Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW &
INEQ. 9 (1985); cf. Stephen J. Morse, Severe Environmental Deprivation (AKA RSB): A
Tragedy, Not a Defense, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 147 (2011).
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Whites. This is, of course, incendiary, and ignores the better approach:
calling for the state to kill less of all people.
A boomerang theory, of course, immediately raises a number of legal and
policy concerns.137 First, what groups would be considered subject to
prevailing stereotypes about violence? While there is significant data on
views related to violence and criminality for Blacks, and to a lesser extent
Latinos, there may be a lack of data for other groups whose members
should qualify. Second, the application of stereotypes means race broadly
might not matter as much as the particular physical characteristics of certain
people of color. Both legal and social science research have tackled
questions related to the legal significance of skin color138 and facial
features.139 Based on this work, one could imagine an argument that fairer
skinned or less ―ethnic-looking‖ people of color should be regarded as
having weaker boomerang claims. Third, because social identity is
composed of multiple factors beyond one‘s race, one might need data on
myriad attributes, which could demonstrate that while black and brown
people are stereotyped as more violent, black women and Latinas are
thought to be less so. Would the gender data caution against these women
asserting boomerang claims?140 There is also the accurate criticism that if
anyone were ever to successfully argue a boomerang defense—e.g., ―I used
early and ill-advised force upon someone because I discerned that based on
my race and gender they were about to do the same to me‖—it would
actually then transform SYG jurisdictions into the worst form of shoot-first
localities. Essentially random and typically nonviolent encounters could
become a race to use violence first based on shared understandings of how
misperceptions work. For example, a person who shoots a black or Latino
man because he or she wrongly perceived them as dangerous could also use
an even more attenuated form of a boomerang claim by stating, ―I shot the
victim because based on his race and gender, I knew that he thought that I
likely thought he was dangerous.‖
137. A boomerang approach might also be unnecessary if jurisdictions would create more
sensitive mistake of fact rules for misapprehending threat/dangerousness under SYG laws.
The issue, however, might be that jurisdictions would find mistakes premised upon race to
be ―reasonable‖ due to the fact that many people are captured by stereotypes. On the concept
of courts accepting as ―reasonable‖ biases found in society, see Joshua Dressler, When
Heterosexual Men Kill Homosexual Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual
Advances, and the Reasonable Man Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995)
(addressing the question within the context of gay panic defenses).
138. See, e.g., COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL
AMERICA (Kimberly J. Norwood ed., 2014); TONRY, supra note 92, at 7; Taunya Lovell
Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (2000) (arguing that skin
tone discrimination disadvantages dark-skinned but not fair-skinned Blacks); Trina Jones,
Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 2000 DUKE L.J. 1487 (arguing that skin color,
rather than the traditionally understood broad category of race, will increasingly provide a
basis for discrimination).
139. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in
Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 674 (2004); Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy,
supra note 90.
140. Essentially, the question for asserting the claim would be whether women of color
would be viewed consistent with their presumed less violent genders or more violent races.
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There is also the issue of confrontations that will suffer from multiple
misperception errors. In the employment context, Professor D. Wendy
Greene has written about misperception discrimination involving workers
who are mistreated at work because they are believed to be a minority when
they are not.141 Misattribution of race within the SYG law context allows
for the compounding effect of misperceptions—e.g., because I erroneously
thought you were black, I viewed you as violent consistent with stereotypes
pertaining to your perceived race. Title VII currently provides no remedy
for such claimants.142 There is a similar question as to whether a
phenotypically racially ambiguous person would be able assert a
boomerang type claim when they may only be perceived as belonging to a
stereotypically violent group, to which they do not actually belong. These
types of extrapolation and compounded misperception errors are maddening
and could go on endlessly. The point, however, is not really to alter who is
justified in shooting first, but to force everyone to understand the harm of
being misperceived as dangerous.143 I know that dislodging the power of
ubiquitous stereotypes and resulting implicit bias is nearly impossible. The
best one can do is cause a person to pause while assessing threat to ask the
question whether they are associating race with dangerousness in a manner
that may result in a false positive. The power of the false positive is greatly
increased when more people can imagine being included within the group.
CONCLUSION
The story around the SYG revolution is still unfolding. Ultimately,
current and future empirical studies of the effects of these statutes will
explicate whether SYG law reforms disserve criminal deterrence goals
and/or create more racially disparate results than other criminal defense
standards. These studies, however, also represent both an opportunity and a
challenge for those of us advancing the potential synergies of a broader
CRT and social sciences project. The promise of such studies is that they
may demonstrate the dangers of expanding state-sanctioned violence, and
do so in a manner that is sufficiently attendant to the lived experiences or
―stories‖ of the disadvantaged. The challenge of over-investing in such
studies is myriad. First, despite what I have articulated here and hope to
accomplish in the future, it is not clear that the social science community
will find future studies more compelling simply because they include
qualitative components. Second, as the current studies evince, more
research may not reconcile the disparate results for the two questions I have
posed. In fact, it may be that we have yet to sufficiently explicate the
141. D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White or Wrong: „Misperception
Discrimination‟ and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87 (2013).
142. See id. at 89–91.
143. This thought experiment is essentially designed to create what CRT luminary,
Professor Derrick Bell, described as an ―interest convergence‖ between white perpetrators
and minority victims. See Derrick Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (describing how interest-convergence
theory surmises that societal gains for Blacks are typically only embraced when they also
include a benefit for Whites).
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variety of distinctions that may matter within the SYG context.144 Finally,
even if studies definitively prove the existence of a racialized effect of SYG
laws, given that racialized effects within self-defense law predate the SYG
reforms, finding such an effect may not be enough to spark repeal efforts.
Any repeal effort, then, might only be possible if the data show a
considerable, comparative disadvantage to such laws.
Finally, there is the problem that such studies might produce counternormative results. While a social scientist might easily accept as true
findings that these criminal law reforms have little to no racialized effect,
such a result would create deep skepticism among many critical scholars. It
is not that critical scholars reject science. Such findings, however, would
be inconsistent with the many studies that have found that race affects one‘s
experience in the criminal justice system. Also, part of what it means to be
a critical thinker is to understand that all methods are fallible and that data
do not interpret themselves.145 Moreover, given that many of us inhabit
minority social identities, it is unlikely that we will decide that the
subordination and structural forms of disadvantage we believe to be real are
actually illusory. The goal, of course, is to continue to assess social science
research to locate places of helpful exchange. Truthfully, however, the
eCRT project likely will not be fully realized until critical and socio-legal
scholars develop something else: trust. That trust will allow critical
scholars to believe that race has been appropriately considered and
measured within data sets.146 Equally as important, it may cause
researchers to reconsider their research results and designs when critical
scholars suggest they are wholly inconsistent with the lived experience of
the legally and socially marginalized. It is only with the development of
this type of mutual respect—one that demonstrates a combined commitment
to the robust investigation of the social forces that disproportionately shape
the lives of those weighted by the burdens of stereotypes—that we will be
able to fully realize the potential of the eCRT project and hopefully
eliminate the need for discussions of false positives or ―boomerangs‖ (even
as a thought experiment).

144. For example, this Article stresses a race question where geography and culture may
also reveal significant aspects of how SYG laws spread and work. See Dov Cohen et al.,
Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An “Experimental Ethnography,”
70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 945 (1996) (describing the ―culture of honor‖ that
exists among white males in Southern versus Northern states and how it may help to explain
greater rates of violent crime in the South). I thank Professor Justin Levinson for drawing
my attention to this research.
145. See WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS, supra note 118.
146. This requirement of a more sophisticated consideration of race has been a significant
goal of the socio-legal scholars that have been the driving force behind eCRT. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.

